The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable
Volume 1 | Issue 1

Article 21

1-1-1993

"Eureka! But I filed too late …": The Harm/Benefit
Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent System
Stephanie Gore

Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable
Recommended Citation
Gore, Stephanie (1993) ""Eureka! But I filed too late …": The Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File Patent System," The
University of Chicago Law School Roundtable: Vol. 1: Iss. 1, Article 21.
Available at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/roundtable/vol1/iss1/21

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in The University of Chicago Law
School Roundtable by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.

"Eureka!But I filed too late... ": The
Harm/Benefit Dichotomy of a First-to-File
Patent System
Stephanie Goret
In the American patent race, the prize goes to the swiftest to
invent-not the swiftest to reach the patent office. For 200 years,
United States patent laws have been designed to award patents
to the first person to discover a "new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof...

."'

Today, the United States is

the only major country to operate under this "first-to-invent"
priority system. That distinction, however, may soon change. In
April 1992, two identical bills intended to harmonize the American patent system with those of the rest of the world were introduced in the House and Senate.2 Those bills set forth the Patent
System Harmonization Act of 1992, which proposes, inter alia,
that the United States convert from the current first-to-invent
system to the "first-to-file" system used by all other countries.
The American patent system has been a primary motivator
for the innovation and development of commercially successful
inventions.' Under a first-to-invent system, the United States
has dominated the rest of the world in innovation "to the point
that in almost every field of industry today the technology is
based largely on inventions which originated in the United
States."4 Any change in this patent system may reduce the
current level of incentive to invent, and the corresponding drop in

B-A 1988, Stanford; M.S. 1989, Georgia Institute of Technology; J.D. Candidate
1994, The University of Chicago.
1 35 USC § 101 (1988).
2 S2605, 102d Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 9, 1992), in 138 Cong Rec S5288 (Apr 9, 1992) and
HR 4978, 102d Cong, 2d Sess (Apr 10, 1992) in 138 Cong Rec E1041 (Apr 10, 1992). This
legislation was debated but not enacted by the last Congress. See 43 BNA Pat, Trademark & Copyright J 519, 533 (1992).
' See Ned L. Conley, First-to-Invent:A Superior System for the, United States, 22 St
Mary's L J 779 (1991).
4 Id at 799.
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the level of invention, production, and manufacture of goods
would adversely affect the ability of the United States to compete
in the world technology market. Obviously, such a result should
be avoided.
Many commentators see first-to-invent as the key feature of
the United States patent system because it provides the incentive
to invent, particularly to inventors who are under-financed.5
Some inventors are already predicting that the Harmonization
Act will "pretty much be the death knell of independent inventors."6 For example, some individuals worry that big companies
have the resources to shower the patent office with applications,
and consequently win the race to acquire a patent by default.
Similarly, critics of the proposed system argue that the first-tofile system favors big companies because those organizations
have the requisite monetary, legal, and technical resources to
consistently file first.7 For these critics, "[t]he question is, do you
want a system that emphasizes filing papers or a system that
encourages people to make gadgets that work?"8 Commentators
on both sides of this debate agree that the potential effect of the
Act on independent inventors could be enormous, given the fact
that roughly one-fifth of the 100,000 patents issued in 1991 went
to independent inventors.
The proposed change to the first-to-file system also implicates the underlying moral principles that justify the grant of
intellectual property rights. Depending on the starting point from
which one view these rights, the effect of this change on inventors may be morally unacceptable. When policy makers view
intellectual property rights solely as a creation of positive law,9
denying a first inventor such rights appears to merely deny the
inventor a benefit. 10 This failure to provide a benefit appears
consistent with common law. As commentators have observed,
"the traditional patterns of judge-made law much more easily

5 Id at 781.
6 John R. Emshwiller, Patent-Law ProposalsIrk Small Inventors, Wall St J B1 (Apr
30, 1992).
' See Conferences: First-to-FileSystem Does Not Get Approval of ABA House of Delegates, 45 BNA Pat, Trademark & Copyright J 323 (1993).
Emshwiller, Wall St J at B2 (cited in note 6).
See, for example, Richard A. Epstein, International News Service v. Associated
Press: Custom and Law As Sources of PropertyRights in News, 78 Va L Rev 85 (1992).
" Under this view, intellectual property rights are merely privileges granted by law.
the baseline from which inventors are viewed is the status quo before any benefits are bestowed.
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provide negative incentives than positive incentives."" However,
if intellectual property rights are viewed as natural rights that
are independent of positive law, then denying property rights to a
first inventor appears to inflict a harm.' Given the common law
pattern of tending to view the duty to guard against harm as
higher than 13the duty to ensure a benefit, this latter result is
questionable.
This Comment explores the potential harms and benefits
that may arise from choosing a first-to-file priority system over a
first-to-invent system for rewarding patent rights to inventors.
The next section provides a framework for this discussion by
examining labor based theories that can be used to support a
natural rights argument for intellectual property. Section II
examines the harms and benefits implicated by the first-to-invent
and first-to-file systems. Depending on the baseline chosen, the
first-to-invent system appears to confer the greatest benefit to a
first-inventor. In the same vein, the first-to-invent system seemingly causes the greatest harm to all other inventors. The first-tofile system, however, gives moderate benefit to the first inventor
to file, and causes moderate harm to all other inventors. Section
HI proposes another system for rewarding patents, which is
loosely modeled on the copyright system and gives the same
rights to all inventors. Under this system, all inventors receive a
moderate benefit and avoid the harm prevalent in the other two
systems. The Comment concludes that both the economic and
moral reasons for preferring the current first-to-invent system
prevail, and therefore the current system for awarding patents
should not be changed. Moreover, the first-to-invent system
appears consistent with the common law preference for avoiding
harm and provide superior incentives to inventors-incentives
that policy makers credit for the success of the American patent
system.

Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual
Property 21 J Legal Stud 449, 450 (1992).
12 Under this view, the inventor's right to the benefit of his or her creation is used as
the baseline. When property rights are not bestowed, the inventor falls below this baseline.
.3See, for example, Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:Intellectual Property
and the Restitutionary Impulse, 48 Va L Rev 149, 207 (1992) ("A second explanation of
judicial solicitude for the restitution defendant stems from the priority that avoiding harm
arguably occupies in our system of law. In our law, the imperative to avoid harm to our
neighbors is stronger and more deeply entrenched than the duty to reward those who
have benefitted us").
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I. NATURAL RIGHTS To INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
A. Defining Baselines
The starting points-or "baselines"-used in legal argument
help to explain the outcomes of legal issues by defining the normative framework from which the outcomes can be predicted. 4
This framework imparts precise meaning to terms such as
"harm" and "benefit", 5 since harm usually indicates the extent
to which a person's welfare is brought below a specified baseline
level, and "benefit" usually indicates the extent to which a
person's welfare is raised above a specified baseline. 6 For example, Cass Sunstein asserts that constitutional analysis often
starts from the unstated baseline of the rights and duties specified in the common law." Sunstein described how the Supreme
Court's choice of baseline in Adkins v Childrens Hospital" and
in West Coast Hotel v Parrish9 helps to explain why the Court
produced opposite conclusions on the issue of minimum wages. In
Adkins, the Court used a common law baseline, 0 which defined
government neutrality in terms of preserving the existing distribution of wealth and entitlements.2 ' Using this baseline, the
Court viewed minimum wage legislation as requiring a subsidy to
the public from "innocent" employers because this legislation
raised the public above the common law baseline.22 By contrast,
the Court shifted its baseline in West Coast Hotel to a system
that entitled all workers to a living wage. Using this baseline,
the Court viewed the State's failure to set a minimum wage as a
subsidy from the public to unconscionable employers because the
lack of minimum wage legislation lowered the public below the
specified baseline.' The choice of baseline in these two cases, as

14 See Jack M. Beermann and Joseph William Singer, Baseline Questions in Legal
Reasoning: The Example of Property in Jobs, 23 Ga L Rev 911 (1989).
15 Gordon, 21 J Legal Stud at 450 (cited in note 11).
16 Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry Into the Merits of Copyright: the Challenges of

Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 Stan L Rev 1343 (1989).
Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 Colum L Rev 873 (1987).
18 261 US 525 (1923).

9 300 US 379 (1937).
o Sunstein uses the term "common law" to refer to "the allocation of rights of use,
ownership, transfer, and possession of property associated with 'laissez-faire' systems and
captured in the common law of the late nineteenth century." Sunstein, 87 Colum L Rev at
907 n 49 (cited in note 17).
21 Id at 874.
2

Id at 875.

' West Coast Hotel, 300 US at 399.
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in many other cases, tilts the "correct" answer toward a predictable outcome.
The choice of baseline affects any analysis of the harms and
benefits that stems from a system of granting intellectual property rights. On the one hand, the "status quo" theory of intellectual
property rights view intellectual property rights as a product of
positive law. The baseline for purposes of defining harms and
benefits is the status quo; i.e. the law bestows a benefit in granting inventors intellectual property rights, since doing so raises
them above the baseline. On the other hand, the "labor-desert"
theory suggests a different baseline. Under this theory, a laborer,
such as an inventor, deserves the fruits of her efforts. Since the
proper desert for the laborer is the set of rights secured by intellectual property law, any system granting these rights leaves
inventors at the baseline. Since the American system of law
seeks to avoid leaving individuals below the baseline, the choice
of where to place the line helps explain the outcomes of cases
dealing with granting intellectual property rights. Under a status
quo baseline it would be "correct" to change the way the law
grants property rights without fear of harming inventors, while
under a desert baseline, such a change would potentially harm
inventors.
B. Natural Law Support for Intellectual Property Rights
One of the major policy debates in intellectual property law
centers on the role of incentive versus the role of competition in
granting intellectual property rights. This "utilitarian battle"24
has led to two different views of intellectual property rights. On
the incentive side of the debate, the standard argument for a
patent system asserts that innovators will not have sufficient
incentives to produce innovations unless they have exclusive
rights to the economic returns.' If inventors do not receive
these exclusive rights, then competitors can copy their innovations without incurring the expenses of innovating and without
compensating the first innovator.26 Without compensation, in-

2 Donald S. Chisum and Michael A. Jacobs, UnderstandingIntellectualProperty Law
§1C (Times Mirror Books, 1992).
1 Roger E. Meiners and Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks:
Propertyor Monopoly? 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol 911, 913 (1990).
This copying is commonly referred to as the "free rider" problem. See, for example,
William A. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective, 30
J L & Econ 265 (1987).
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ventors will lack the ex ante incentive to innovate. By contrast,
those who champion the competition side of this debate argue
that consumers benefit from free competition among producers.
Because "the effect [of competition] is more efficient resource
distribution and lower prices,"27 advocates of competition argue
that intellectual property rights should therefore be strictly limited in order to enhance access to information needed to fuel competition.
Paralleling the utilitarian debate lies a "moral battle" focused on the role of property versus the role of monopoly.'
Those who are persuaded by incentive arguments see exclusive
intellectual property rights as a form of property, not monopoly.29 "Giving exclusive rights to an author or inventor is no more
a monopoly or anticompetitive than other species of real or personal property."" By contrast, those individuals that advance
competition arguments view intellectual property rights as monopolies.3 1 However, those advocates concede that for policy reasons, such monopolies may be desirable (or at least tolerable).
The moral debate also has a foundation independent of utilitarian considerations. This foundation consists of a natural rights
school of thought which favors recognizing inventors' rights as
moral rights, regardless of the economic effects. 2 The effect of
this school of thought can be seen in American jurisprudence,
where natural rights have been used to justify intellectual property rights.3 Courts dealing with intellectual property have specifically justified granting such rights by looking to Locke's theory of labor. 4 In early cases, courts held that inventors received
27

Chisum § 1C (cited in note 24).

2

Id.

29 See, for example, Panduit Corp v Stahlin Bros Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F2d 1152,

1158 n 5 (6th Cir 1978): "The right to exclude others from free use of an invention protected by a valid patent does not differ from the right to exclude others from free use of one's
automobile, crops, or other items of personal property. Every human right, including that
in an invention, is subject to challenge under appropriate circumstances. That one human
property right may be challenged by trespass, another by theft, and another by infringement, does not affect the fundamental indicium of 'all' property, i.e., the right to exclude
others." Id.
30 Chisum §1C (cited in note 24).
"
Note Chisum's argument that in court opinions, "[i]f limited or legal 'monopoly' appears frequently, it is likely that the court will give a narrow interpretation to the patent
or copyright. If 'intellectual property' is used, it is likely that the court will give a broader
interpretation." Id.
32 Id.
" See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 Georgetown L J 287
(1988).
" See, for example, Ruckelshaus v Monsanto Co, 467 US 986, 1002-03 (1984) (noting
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nothing from the law that they did not previously have before,
and that the only effect of the patent is to prevent others from
manufacturing and using the invention. 5 These courts viewed
patents as providing monopolies to protect what inventors gained
through their labor by using a moral theory based on labor principles as a baseline for patent rights.
The next section on labor theory discusses the moral arguments that may be used to support the underlying policy reasons
for granting intellectual property rights. These arguments provide a baseline for examining the possible effects of different
priority systems on inventor incentives.
1. Labor Theory.
Labor theorists view rights to property as "natural" in the
sense that "the force of these rights.., can be recognized as
valid by moral and rational people quite apart from any provisions of positive law." 6 This concept forms the independent moral background to Locke's labor theory of property rights. Locke
begins with the premise that he who makes something new,
without depriving others, is entitled to have some right in the
thing produced: 7
The labor of his body and the work of his hands, we may
say, are properly his.... It being removed from the common
state nature hath placed it in, it hath by this labour
something annexed to it that excludes the common right of
other men.3"
The root idea of Locke's labor theory stems from the argument that people are entitled to hold, as property, whatever they
produce by their own initiative, intelligence, and industry. 9
Locke created this concept in three steps.4" First, he began with
the religious proposition that "no one ought to harm another in

that the "perception of trade secrets as property" is consonant with a Lockean labor
theory of property).
United States v American Bell Telephone Co, 167 US 224, 249 (1896).
3'Jeremy Waldron, The Right to PrivateProperty 19 (Clarendon, 1988).
Gordon, 21 J L Stud at 478 (cited in note 11).
8 John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise ch 5 at 134 (Thomas
Cook, ed, Hafner Publishing Co, 1947).
"' Lawrence C. Becker, PropertyRights: Philosophic Foundations32 (Routledge & K.
Paul, 1977).
"' See Gordon, 48 Va L Rev at 208-09 (cited in note 13).
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his life, health, liberty, or possessions. " " He then argued that
each person has a property in his body and in the labor of his
body.4 2 Finally, Locke suggested that "when one appropriates
things from the common ... one joins one's labor to the things so
taken. 43 From these three steps, Locke concluded that others
have no right to that to which someone else's labor is "joined."
Locke views the benefits of property rights as precisely those
benefits people deserve by virtue of the pains they have taken,
and if there are no strong countervailing reasons asserting otherwise," then granting those benefits is justified.45 Locke's "taking pains" argument justifies a property claim: "when the labor is
[1] beyond what is required, morally, that one do for others; [21
produces something which would not have existed except for it;
and [3] its product is something which others lose nothing by
being excluded from; then [4] it is not wrong for producers to
exclude others from the possession, use, etc. of the fruits of their
labors."46
Locke's justification for property rights, however, cannot
serve as a baseline to explain the current set of intellectual property rights granted to patentees. Although intellectual property
rights meet some of the elements required by Locke's labor theory, those rights inherently fail to fulfill all of these requirements.
The first requirement, that the labor be above and beyond what
morality requires a person to do for others, is fulfilled because
there is no requirement that intellectual property be produced to
benefit others. The second requirement, that the labor produce
something which would not otherwise have been produced, is
fulfilled by patent law because patents are only issued for "new,
useful, and nonobvious" processes or products. However patent
rights do not meet the the third requirement, that property
rights not cause a loss to others who are excluded from them. If,
as some writers argue, this restriction was meant to prevent a
laborer from taking away the existing goods of others," then
intellectual property rights such as copyright can be justified.49

4

Locke, Two Treatises of Government at 123-24 (cited in note 38).

412Id

at 134.

4' Id at 134-35.
4' "[A]t least where there is enough and as good left in common for others." Id at 134.
Becker, PropertyRights at 36 (cited in note 39).
4 Id at 41.
4 35 USC § 101 (cited in note 1).
48 See Becker, Property Rights at 42 (cited in note 39).
4' Since copyright owners can prevent copying of their intellectual products, but can-

293]

First-to-FilePatent System

However, this third requirement will be violated by patent rights.
Under the current system of awarding patents, only one inventor
reaps the fall benefits of his or her labor; other inventors are
denied these benefits, regardless of the pains they took to invent.
Locke generally provides little help in justifying intellectual
property laws that enforce a laborer's rights when a second person enjoys the fruits of the labor in a way that does not interfere
with the laborer, and enforcing the laborer's rights greatly interferes with the second person. 0 This conclusion stems mainly
from the fact that Locke does not discuss objects from which two
parties can simultaneously draw benefits.5 ' Locke assumes that
the measure of property is a function of labor,5 2 and limited by
nature to what can be appropriated by labor without causing
harm to anyone."3 However, the nature of intellectual property
precludes a natural limit.
Locke's labor theory also seems to be an unfit base for discussing intellectual property rights because of his "waste" discussion.' There, Locke implies that when the fruits the laborer
gathers are in danger of spoiling, the laborer loses his title in
them. Rather than have the harvest go to waste, Locke would allow others to take the benefit of the laborer's efforts.5 5 The significance of this discussion is debatable. One accepted interpretations of Locke's waste discussion describes the laborer as having
no claim in what he himself would not use. However, limiting the
benefits of intellectual property rights to what an inventor could
personally consume would not fulfill the goals of patent law because such a rule would not provide adequate incentives to pro-

not prevent independent creations of an identical product, it is possible for many people to
have rights in identical products without denying these rights to others.
'o For example, in the case of patent infringement, the inventor can still use a patent
after it has been infringed, but the infringer cannot use the patent if the inventor asserts
his rights to it.
"
Locke, Two Treatises of Government 137 n 35 (cited in note 38).
2 "The measure of property nature has well set by the extent of men's labour and the
conveniences of life." Id at 138.
' 'This measure did confine every man's possession to a very moderate proportion,
and such as he might appropriate to himself without injury to anybody...." Id.
'

"... he that so employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of na-

ture as any way to alter them from the state which nature put them in, by placing any of
his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them; but, if they perished in his
possession without their due use... he offended against the common law of nature, and
was liable to be punished; he invaded his neighbor's share, for he had no right farther
than his use called for any of the, and they might serve to afford him conveniences of life."
Id at 139-140.
6' Id at 136, 144.
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mote innovation.
In his article on property rights, Lawrence Becker points out
that Locke's labor theory is limited in the extent it adequately
justifies the use of property rights in competitive situations.5 6 In
these situations, when a party is put at a competitive disadvantage, that party suffers a loss. Exclusive property rights which
put others at a competitive disadvantage take away "an existing
good"-namely, competitive parity.57 This disposition violates
Locke's requirement that no one suffer a loss by the producer's
acquisition of property. As Becker points out, "[i]f there is general
agreement that laborers should get property rights in the fruits
of their labor, there is also general agreement that this should
not be at the expense of others."5 8
Becker concludes that Locke's labor theory cannot serve as a
fundamental moral principle for property rights. Other writers
also agree that the theory is unsatisfactory, mainly because it
rests on unrealistic assumptions.59 Despite these criticisms,
Locke's labor theory has been used as a foundation for many
moral principles, such as the labor-desert theory.
2. Labor-Desert Theory.
"I took the trouble to make it; I deserve some reward for my
efforts.... ."" The notion of desert remains a familiar and prominent feature of morality. 1 Becker uses this basic principle as a
foundation to support a labor-desert theory of property. Under
the theory, desert based on labor anchors prima facie moral property rights. In turn, those rights serve as a prima facie justification for legal property rights.62
The labor-desert principle has four main features.6 3 First, a
laborer is due a benefit for adding value, and a penalty for subtracting value. Second, the principle does not apply to cases

57

Becker, Property Rights at 43 (cited in note 39).
Id.
Id at 47.

5' One unrealistic assumption is that the things laborers seek to acquire are available

in sufficient quantity and quality for others to acquire so that the things are not acquired
to the detriment of others. Stephen R. Munzer, A Theory of Property 254-91 (Cambridge,
1990).
Becker, Property Rights at 41 (emphasis in the original) (cited in note 39).
61 See, for example, Stephen R. Munzer, The Acquisition of Property Rights, 66 Notre
Dame L Rev 661 (1991).
62 Becker, Property Rights at 47 (cited in note 39).
'

Id at 51-52.

2931

First-to-FilePatentSystem

where a laborer derives gain by violating moral prohibitions,
such as unjustifiably. overriding-the rights of others. Third, a
benefit or penalty must be proportional to the value added or
subtracted by the labor. Finally, the type of benefit must fit the
type of labor or the particular laborer.' This final feature raises
the question of whether there are some types of labor for which
property rights are the only fitting benefit. If the whole purpose
of the laborer's efforts is to get and keep as property whatever he
produces, and if the laborer deserves a benefit for his efforts,65
then property rights are obviously the only fitting benefit.6 6
The labor-desert theory views people as "agents who, by their
actions in the world, are responsible for changes in the world and
deserve or merit something as a result." 7 In general, a desert
claim must be based on some fact about the deserving person.
Specifically, the laborer must have "added value" to the world, by
discovering, inventing, or improving something which helps others.' According to the theory, a demonstration of labor, while a
necessary condition for desert, is not a sufficient condition:
"[1]abor alone-labor which neither adds to nor diminishes value-does not deserve anything."" To this condition Becker adds
two more notions borrowed from labor theory: [1] that the resulting deed be morally permissible, and [21 that it be beyond what is
morally required of the person. When these requirements are
met, "adding value" then becomes a basis for a desert-claim. 0
Becker's labor-desert theory provides a good moral justification for intellectual property rights, especially in competitive
situations, because it does not require that a person not cause a
loss. Rather, there are only the requirements that [11 a value be
added, [21 that the desert be proportional to this added value, [3]
that the desert violate no moral prohibitions, and [4] that the
type of benefit fit the labor or laborer. In the case of technological
problems, for which a unique or very small class of solutions

' Becker uses the example of the unfitness of using a candy bar for rewarding someone who does not like sweets. Id at 52.
' "Deserves" is defined in terms of the first, second, and fourth desert principles

outlined above.
66 However, to argue that certain benefits are fitting because without them people
would not do the things we want them to do is to give a utility argument, not a labordesert argument. Becker, Property Rights at 52-53 (cited in note 39).
Munzer, A Theory of Property at 255-56 (cited in note 59).
Becker, PropertyRights at 49 (cited in note 39).
Id at 52.
70 Id at 50.
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exist, an invention by one person who is granted full property
rights over the invention significantly diminishes the opportunities of others. Under the desert principle, inventor's rights are
limited. For example, the granting of patent rights could be characterized as unjustifiably overriding the rights of others. However, there are no grounds under the desert principle for penalizing
someone just because she has invented something unique. "Inventions per se do not diminish the net number of opportunities
to invent other things, any more than the writing of Moby Dick
diminished the opportunities of subsequent novelists. The classes
of possibilities are not finite."' 1 As Becker notes in the case of
art works, 2 each patented invention by its very existence creates new possibilities for subsequent works that sufficiently improve upon the invention to statutorily be considered new, patentable ideas.73
Intellectual property rights do not suffer from the limitations
present in the labor theory, and meet the requirements of all four
principles of the labor desert theory. Those rights appear to meet
the first principle of the desert theory because inventors add a
positive value to the world, both by providing others with new
ideas that may be built upon, and by providing the public with
benefits from new inventions. Intellectual property rights also
meet the second principle of the desert theory, since there are no
moral prohibitions to awarding intellectual property rights so
long as awarding those rights does not diminish opportunities for
other inventors. In accordance with the third desert principle, the
benefits from intellectual property rights presumably are proportional to the positive value added to the world by inventors. 4
Pursuant to the fourth desert principle, intellectual property
rights are built upon the notion that an indispensable part of
inventive efforts is the reaping of benefits brought about by the
rights awarded 5-- precisely the type of desert to fit the labor. In

71

Id.

72

Id.

See, for example, 35 USC § 103 (1988), which requires that an invention be a
nonobvious development over the prior art.
"' See, for example, the constitutional text regarding patent rights, which reflects the
judgment that the government could "promote the progress of science and the useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights to their respective writings and discoveries." US Const Art I, § 8,cl7 (emphasis added).
" "The 'monopoly-profit-incentive' thesis assumes ... that inventions and their industrial exploitation will not be obtained in sufficient measure if inventors and capitalists
can hope only for such profits as the competitive exploitation of all technical knowledge
will permit. To make it worthwhile for inventors and their capitalist backers to make
7'
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short, the labor-desert theory provides a clearer conception of
when those laboring at intellectual property efforts deserve to
own what they produce. This theory can thus be used as a baseline to begin to analyze some of the effects on inventors of changing from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file priority system.
II. FIRST-TO-INVENT VS. FIRST-To-FILE
A. First-to-Invent
As the last country in the world to determine priority among
competing inventors on a first-to-invent basis, the United States
patent system awards patent rights to the inventor who can
prove he had an idea first, regardless of when he files. The first
inventor receives all of the benefits of his intellectual labor, and
all subsequent inventors get none of the fruits of their labor.7"
The efficacy of this system, defined from a natural rights baseline, can be analyzed by looking at the harms and benefits produced for the laborers involved.
Under a status quo approach, the patent rights granted to
the first inventor raise him above the baseline. The status quo
baseline does not require the rights given under a first-to-invent
system, because under this approach inventors are not entitled to
any benefit. Even if the intellectual property rights are decreased
to a level incapable of providing inventors with sufficient incentive to innovate, the status quo baseline still perceives no harm
to the inventor. By contrast, when a baseline is founded upon the
natural rights of an inventor, the intellectual property rights
granted by patent laws put the inventor at the baseline, and any
change that decreases those rights amounts to a harm to the inventor.
While the current first-to-invent system appears to provide
sufficient incentives to the first inventor, it completely denies all
other inventors rights flowing from the same labor. As previously

their efforts and risk their money, society must intervene to increase their profit expectation." Fritz Machlup, An Economic Review of the Patent System, Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
study no 15, 85th Cong, 2d Sess (1958).
" Those in favor of abolishing the first-to-invent system point to the fact that only
1% of patents filed have associated interference proceedings, and of those interferences,
only 25% have resulted in priority awards to the junior party, suggesting that the current
system is de facto a first-to-file system. Donald Dunner, First To File: Should Our Interference System Be Abolished? 48 J Pat Off Soc'y 561 (1986). However, I am assuming for
the purpose of this argument that the patent is issued to the true first inventor.
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discussed, desert principles assert that a laborer should not receive a benefit for adding value if he does so by violating moral
prohibitions such as "unjustifiably" overriding the rights of others." Because the underlying policy of intellectual property law
focuses on giving sufficient incentives for the initial production
and manufacture of goods, the granting of property rights does
not appear to unjustifiably override others' rights. The desert
involved would otherwise be inadequate to satisfy any of the
inventors. If intellectual property laborers are interested in receiving the benefit of a patent monopoly, then anything less
would not "befit the labor or the laborer."
It should be noted, however, that the first-to-invent system,
can result in situations where an inventor appears grossly overcompensated at the expense of others. One example is the recent
award of a patent that shook the semi-conductor industry. In
1990, Gilbert P. Hyatt won a 20-year battle for a patent on the
basic microprocessor when a patent was issued for his invention
7
of a "Single Chip Integrated Circuit Computer Architecture.E
On November 24, 1969, Mr. Hyatt first filed a patent application
for this invention based on work he commenced in 1968. Prior to
learning of the Hyatt patent, other innovators in the semiconductor and computer industries thought that the first microprocessor
was invented by Ted Hoff at the Intel Corporation in 1971. In the
meantime, the use of microprocessors became ubiquitous in products used in every part of the world. If the Hyatt patent is upheld and deemed sufficiently broad to cover at least a small percentage all of the microprocessors currently being manufactured,
then its impact on many industries could be enormous.
Hyatt's story not only demonstrates the risks of unfairness to
subsequent innovators unaware that they were using Hyatt's
design, but also shows the risks of severe economic dislocation for
the many people and companies with businesses built upon the
knowledge of Hyatt's work.79 Under a labor-desert theory, the
Hyatt example does indeed seem to unjustifiably override the
rights of others. However, if the reward for Hyatt can be justified
as the only one befitting the labor, then the desert-labor theory
asserts that any utilitarian economic concerns are irrelevant.
7' Becker, PropertyRights at 52 (cited in note 39).
78 US Patent No 4,942,516. See Bernarr R. Pavel, Why the United States Should

Adopt the First-to-Filefor Patents, 22 St Mary's L J 797, 803 (1991).
" Jack E. Brown, The Protection of High Technology Intellectual Property:An International Perspective, Prentice Hall Computer Lawyer 1, 4 (Dec 1990), available on
WESTLAW (JLR file).
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Figure 1 summarizes the harm/benefit analysis for the firstto-invent priority system.
Figure 1.
Baseline = Natural right

F RST-TO-INVENT

Baseline = Status uo
Benefit to first

inventor (no harm
or benefit to
all other inventors)

Harm to all other
inventors (no harm
or benefit to first
to invent)

B. First-to-File
The Harmonization Act proposes a new system under which
the Patent Office would determine priority by the date of filing,
rather than by the date of invention.' In addition to amending
the procedure for deciding priority, the proposed system includes
two further changes that might affect the harm/benefit analysis
of the first-to-file system. First, the Harmonization Act includes a
provisional application option that is designed to allay concerns
about legitimate inventors not winning the race to the Patent
Office. This provision permits inventors to pay a partial application fee upon filing, while leaving the balance of the fee unpaid
until the inventor is ready to initiate the patent search and examination process. The application would also hold the inventor's
place in line and secure an early priority date for determining
which inventor was the first to file. Second, the Act proposes to
change prior user rights for those who independently develop an
invention before another inventor patents it. Prior user rights
grant limited personal rights to make, use, and sell an invention
to any person or assignee who commercially used or made substantial steps for commercial use of the invention in good faith
prior to the filing date of the applicant entitled to the patent.
The first change has no real impact on the harm/benefit
analysis. The argument that this provision would preserve the
rights of the first inventor is unconvincing because ultimately the
patent would go to the first person to file a provisional applica-

'

See 138 Cong Rec at S5288 and 138 Cong Rec at E1041 (cited in note 2).
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tion without reference to the date of invention. The second
change, however, has a substantial impact on the harm/benefit
analysis. Whereas first-to-invent precludes all other inventors
from reaping benefits, the addition of prior user rights would
allow all the inventors who are not swift enough to file first to
reap some benefits of their labor.81 With a status quo baseline,
all inventors who file after the patent recipient receive a small
benefit in the form of prior user rights. With a natural rights
baseline, although later inventors are still harmed, the harm is
less than under a first-to-invent system.
For the inventor who receives a patent, the benefit received
under first-to-file is smaller than the benefit received under firstto-invent since prior user rights diminish the value of a patent.
There may be dozens of prior users unknown to the patent recipient due, in part, to large companies with enough resources to
engage in secret development projects.82 With the status quo as
the baseline, this inventor still receives a benefit but this benefit
varies with the number of prior users. If there are no prior users,
then this benefit will equal the monopoly rights granted under
the first-to-invent system; otherwise, the benefit will always be
less. In either case, the inventor remains above the baseline.
With a natural rights baseline, the patent recipient actually
suffers a harm from the prior user rights if monopoly rights are
assumed to be the proper reward for the inventor's labor. Figure
2 summarizes the harm/benefit analysis for the first-to-file priority system.
Figure 2.
Baseline = Natural right

FIRST-TO-FILE

Baseline = Status quo

Benefit to first
to file

Harm to first
inventor and to any
other inventors who
did not file first

8, As mentioned above, prior user rights consist of a limited personal right to make,
use and sell the invention that is given to any person, or her assignee, who commercially
used, or made substantial steps for commercial use of, the invention prior to the filing
date of the applicant entitled to the patent. Note that the commercial use requirement
effectively sets a minimum level of labor for the prior user/inventor before he is eligible
for any user rights.
82 See Patent System Harmonization Legislation Is Debated in Joint Senate-House
Hearing, 44 BNA Pat, Trademark & Copyright J 3, 4-5 (May 7, 1992).
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If the labor-desert analysis above is correct for intellectual
property, then the diminished benefit offered to a patent recipient under the first-to-file system is unacceptable. In the first-toinvent system, this harm was justified by the argument that
overriding the rights of subsequent inventors in favor of the first
inventor is the only system that can provide adequate incentives
to innovate. However, this argument does not work for the firstto-file system since it does not appear to offer the same level of
incentives. In comparison with first-to-file countries, America
seems to provide more incentive to innovate." Countries that
have first-to-file systems issue fewer patents in proportion to the
number of applications filed.' Where there is a statistical inference that there is less incentive to innovate under a first-to-file
system, the labor-desert principle would suggest that inventors
did not find the rewards of that system fit for their labor.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: "ALL-WHO-INVENT"
The ideal priority system, from a labor-desert perspective, is
one that provides a reward befitting the labor, but avoids the
problematic harms that must be justified. One possibility is a
system modelled after copyright law. Under copyright law, an author or copyright owner has the exclusive right to make copies of
his or her work.85 This right is maintained without having to
demonstrate that she was the first to create the expression embodied in her work. Essentially, all that is required for a valid
copyright is originality, i.e. proof that the author did not copy the
work from someone else.86 This system allows creators of the
same work to have the same rights to their creative efforts.
Under a patent system analogous to the copyright system, all
inventors would be given equal rights to their invention. Unlike
the prior user rights proposed under the first-to-file system, the
rights here would not place any additional requirements on inventors (e.g. a requirement that she commercially use the invention prior to the issuance of the patent). All inventors would have
to fulfill the same basic patentability requirements such as usefulness, nonobviousness, and novelty, but no more.F

See Conley, 22 St Mary's L J at 781 (cited in note 3).
Id.
See 17 USC § 106(1) (1988).
See 17 USC § 102(a) (1988).
I vill set aside for the moment the obvious enforcement problems of such a system,
such as multiple plaintiffs pursuing a single defendant for infringement of the same idea.
'3
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Ideally, this alternative system would produce the
harm/benefit pattern shown in Figure 3. Under the status quo
baseline, this approach would produce sufficient benefits to all
inventors.8 8 Viewed from the natural rights baseline, all inventors would be left at the baseline, reflecting the fact that the
inventors were granted all the rights they deserved by virtue of
their labor.
Figure 3. ' DEAi" ALL-wH--ENT
Baseline = Natural right

Baseline = Status quo

Benefit to all
inventors

No harm or benefit
to any inventors

The property rights granted to the inventors under this "allwho-invent" concept, however, are not equal to those granted
under a first-to-invent system. The labor-desert analysis of the
first-to-file system already reveal the problems inherent in the
grant of rights limited by the grant of equivalent rights to other
inventors. The all-who-invent system, when viewed from a natural rights baseline, would result in a moderate harm to all inventors. When viewed from a status quo baseline, the all-who-invent
system only accords inventors a moderate benefit. (See Figure 3).
Thus, the all-who-invent system shares the problem of the
first-to-file system in that the reward does not seem to befit the
laborer. Any incentive to invent under this system is even weaker than under the first-to-file system because more "prior users"
meet the requirements to acquire the patent and those users
would have to be given full patent rights. Since this system is
unlikely to provide adequate incentives to innovate, diminishing
the rights granted to inventors does not appear to be justified by
the underlying goals of the American patent system. The system
may prevent the large harm to other inventors seen under the
first-to-invent system, but it does not provide the necessary in-

This could occur due to broad patent infringement rules not present in copyright law,
such as the doctrine of equivalents.
' Here "sufficient" is defined as the level of benefits providing adequate incentives to
innovate.
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centives to inventors for maintaining the high rate of innovation
in America.
CONCLUSION

To justify the first-to-invent patent system, one must resort
to utilitarian arguments. The standard utilitarian argument for
this system asserts that innovators will not have sufficient incentive to produce unless they have a monopoly right to economic returns.89The success of the American patent system over the past
200 years seems proof that the current systeni, based on conferring large benefits to the first inventor, works exceedingly well in
providing adequate incentives to innovators. When compared
with the United States first-to-invent priority system, first-to-file
does indeed appear to provide less incentives to innovate." In
countries using a first-to-file priority system, there is a relative
decrease in the number of inventions. Any change in the American patent system that would bring similar results would be
counter to the primary, indeed the constitutional, goal of patent
law-to promote the progress of the useful arts." Under the
first-to-invent system, the main incentive to innovate is the hope
of profit. Accordingly, a system that gives the exclusive right to
this profit without diverting any portion of it to other inventors
naturally optimizes this motivation.
The analysis undertaken here shows that it is not possible to
fashion a system of awarding patents that provides a desert befitting inventors without impinging on the rights of others. Violations of this moral principle may be justified simply by the fact
that there would otherwise be no desert to fit the labor or laborers involved. The validity of this conclusion may intially appear
to be brought into question when one considers that the system
of awarding copyright operates very well awarding less than
monopolistic property rights. However, the more limited benefits
granted under copyright law are those befitting copyright holders,
and such benefits would not befit inventors.92
An exclusive right system is basically a utilitarian notion,
but one that finds support in moral theories based on the labor
principle. As Becker put it, "[w]hy shouldn't the industrious gain
Meiners and Staaf, 13 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 912 (cited in note 25).
Conley, 22 St Mary's L J at 786-87 (cited in note 3).
', See US Const Art I,§ 8.
For discussion, see William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis of Copyright Law, 18 J Legal Stud 325 (1989).
"

'o
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competitive advantages over the non-industrious?"93 Locke himself remarks that "[God] gave [the earth] to the use of the industrious and rational-and labour was to be his title to it .... 94
While a natural rights argument for intellectual property rights
would grant those rights regardless of utilitarian economic arguments, the underlying policy of intellectual property law requires
a balance between innovation and competition. Arguably, if monopoly rights strike the proper balance for patents, then those
rights befit the labor involved and serve to justify overriding the
rights of others. Thus, in both moral and economic conflicts, the
property rights provided by first-to-invent regime appear to provide a superior system of patent distribution.

Becker, Property Rights at 42 (cited in note 39).
Locke, Two Treatises of Government at 137 (cited in note 38).

